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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND POLICE-CITIZEN CONFRONTATIONS
LAWRENCE P. TIFFANY
The author is Professor of Law at the University of Denver. He received his A.B. (1961) and his
LL.B. (1963) degrees from Washington University, and his S.J.D. (1967) from the University of
Wisconsin. In 1969-70 he is on leave to the American Bar Foundation.
Police "field interrogation" which may or may not result in prosecution, based upon standards less
stringent than the fourth amendment's "probable cause" requirement, has recently been the subject
of several Supreme Court decisions. The author reviews these cases from the point of view of the adequacy of the Court's response to two major questions relating to field interrogation: (1) Whether
police may use this device upon a person they believe is about to commit a crime; and (2) Whether
"consent" doctrines should be given legal recognition in the context of field interrogation.

The question of the constitutionality of police
field interrogation practices has generated great
interest in the past several years. Although
'courts have litigated this question for decades,1
a major discussion of the problem did not
appear in legal literature until 1960.2 In 1964 the
New York legislature enacted a statute authorizing
police to stop and frisk suspects who could not be
arrested. That statute attracted considerable attention to the problem. Since then, the frequency
of litigation of field interrogation issues has increased, and over fifty publications now exist on
the subject. The problem has been discussed extensively by the American Law Institute in connection with the initial draft of the Model Code of
Pre-ArraignmentProcedure4 and in the American
Bar Foundation's Survey of Administration of
Criminal Justice in the United States.' The report
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of justice discussed the
practice briefly and concluded that police authority

to stop, question, and frisk suspicious persons who
cannot be arrested should be made explicit0
The Court gave an opinion on that. question for
the first time in 1968Y The caution with which they
did so reflects the legal complexity of the problems
associated with police on-the-street practices (particularly those motivated by a desire to prevent
crime), the exceptionally divergent responses to
those practices in case law and legal literature, and
the recognition that police-citizen confrontations
on the street are major contributing factors to in-

creased racial tensions. The Task Force on Police
concluded that:
"Misuse of field interrogations ... is causing

serious friction with minority groups in many
localities. This is becoming particularly true as
more police departments adopt 'aggressive

patrol' in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the
e THE PESmENT'S CoASnhsSION ON LAW ENFORCE=ENT

AND

ADIIINISTRATION oF JUsTicE, THE CHAL-

I California has the most extensive case law on field LENGE OF C E IN A FREE SoCiETY 95 (1967). See also
interrogation, and its development there is traceable to THE PRESIDENT's ComrssIoN ON LAW ENwoRcEmENT
AND ADmINISTRATION OF JUsTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
Gisske v. Sanders, 9 Cal. App. 13, 98 Pac. 43 (1908).
2Remington, The Law Relating to "on the Street" TBE PoLIcE 183-86 (1967). Supporting documents
Detention, Questioning and Friskingof Suspected Persons treat the problems in more detail. See V FIE=D SURand Police Arrest Privilegesin General, 51 J. Czrs. L.C. vEYS, THE NAT'L CENTER ON POLICE AND COMMUNITY
RELATIONS AT MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, A NA& P.S. 386 (1960).
3 N.Y. CODE CRm.

PRoC. §180-a (McKinney Supp.

1967).

4ALI MODEL CODE or PRE-AREA GN5ENT PRocEDiYEE §2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966). The discussion
of this section is reported in 43 Al PRoCEEDINGs
52-157 (1966).

5 LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION4 To TAKE A SUS-

xc'T INTO

CUSTODY

289-97

(1965);

TIFFANY,

McINTYRE & ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRmEr:
STOPPING AND QUESTIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAP ExT 6-94 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DETECTION]. Descriptive material is also
found in Amaxi. CA BAR FOUNDATION, LAW ENroRcEMENT IN

METROPOLIS

18-22 (1967).

TIONAL SURVEY OF POrCu AND CoMUNITY RELATIONS

327-36 (1967); IV FIELD SuRVEYs, LoH rN & MISNER,
THE PoLIcE AND TH

ComiuNry: THE DYNAmcs OF

THEIR RELATIONSHIP IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (Vois. I

& 2, 1967); Black & Reiss, Patterns of Behavior in
Police and Citizen Transactions,in III FIELD SURvEys,
2 STUDIES or CRnIm AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN MAJOR

(1967).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Sibron is a consolidation
of two cases, the other one being Peters v. New York.
Certiorari was dismissed in a fourth case as improvidently granted. Wainwright v. City of New Orleans,
392 U.S. 598 (1968).
METROPOLITAN
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street who are unknown to them, who are
suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad
is not readily evident. The Michigan State
survey found that both minority group
leaders and persons sympathetic to minority
groups throughout the country were almost
unanimous in labelling field interrogation as a
principal problem in police-community relations." I
The Chief Justice gave recognition to the importance of the question: "We would," he wrote, "be
less than candid if we did not acknowledge that
this question thrusts to the fore difficult and
troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of
police activity-issues which have never before
been squarely presented to this Court." 9
There are many difficult issues involved in the
field interrogation controversy, and it would have
been surprising had the Court tried to resolve a
major part of them. But it is equally surprising
how narrow the scope of the decisions was. Terry,
the most important of the cases, holds only that
when an officer is investigating a suspicious person
the officer may frisk him for dangerous weapons if
he has evidence that reasonably leads him to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous. Such
a search is not unreasonable under the fourth
amendment despite the lack of probable cause to
arrest if it is limited to patting down the exterior
clothing of the suspect. The authority to frisk is
superfluous when the officer arrests on probable
cause and searches the suspect incident to that
arrest.
The Court did not deal with the problem of detention prior to frisking, with interrogation, or with
the constitutionality of the New York stop-andfrisk statute. These are issues which many observers believed were central to the litigation of
these three cases. The Court also failed to say
whether states may still choose to define suspicious
conduct as a substantive offense to permit arrest
5

Tnx

PREsmENT's CoMnssION oN LAW ENrORCE-

mENT AND AmDNISTRATION o JusTIcE, TAsK FORCE
REPORT: THE PoLIcE 184 (1967).

9Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1968). The issue

was presented to the Court by the government in Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960). The government

there had argued "that a police officer may stop any
person for the purpose of inquiry on less information
than would constitute probable cause for arrest; and
that any temporary detention that may be involved in
the act of making inquiry does not constitute an arrest."
Brief for United States, p. 24. Rios is discussed more
fully in Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Administrative,
.Tudicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DENvER L.J.
389. 401-04 (1966).

and conviction under circumstances which, under
Terry, would only permit a frisk.10 They did not
discuss the admissibility of evidence other than
weapons turned up by a Terry frisk. The number
of issues left undecided are sufficient to encourage
litigation for years to come. The reasons why these
opinions are so narrow in scope must obviously be
speculative at this time, but the answer may be
important to an accurate appraisal of these decisions.
The first explanation is the most obvious: The
issues involved in police field interrogation practices are so difficult to resolve and so new to the
Court that they could not reach acceptable agreement on any question beyond the need to frisk
under Terry circumstances. A second explanation is
also possible: The actual consensus may have been
to avoid these issues, not because the Court could
not reach sufficient agreement on them, but because the Court thought it would be unwise to
adopt fixed rules on the first occasion of significant
national awareness of the problems inherent in
these practices. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, of course, but the second explanation, which suggests a wait-and-see posture, carries
with it important implications about the responsibility of police departments for field interrogation
practices.
Police departments typically have eschewed
public acknowledgment of any responsibility for
policy formulation." Even less often have they
initiated and involved themselves in public evaluation of whatever policies might exist within their
departments. Most departments have behaved
this way with respect to field interrogation practices. Indeed, many deny they stop and question
suspects who may not be arrested.
One consequence of the failure of the police to
permit critical and public evaluation of their practices is that courts are forced to do so without the
benefit of any significant agency or community
10In addition to a statute which authorizes field
interrogation, New York' also has a statute which provides that a person is gulity of loitering when he:
Loiters, remains or wanders in or about a place
without apparent reason and under circumstances
which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or
about to engage in crime, and, upon inquiry by a
peace officer, refuses to identify himself or fails to
give a reasonably credible account of his conduct
and purposes.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §240.35(6) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
The statute is discussed in Schwartz, Stop and Frisk,
58 J. CRmOL.C. &P.S. 433,459 (1967).
1 LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 510-14.
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participation in the decision-making process. Secondly, it should not be surprising if much of the
public continues to be hostile toward police practices when there has been no opportunity for public
participation in formulation of the policies underlying those practices.
It is true that the Court in Terry deliberately
adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward field interrogation practices, then the obligation of local
officials-particularly the police-is clear. For
whatever reasons, departments now have the
opportunity to begin the process of publicly developing fair and workable standards to guide their
on-the-street practices and to develop adequate
control mechanisms to insure compliance with
them.
But development of evidentiary and procedural
standards to which police ought to adhere in conducting field interrogations will be retarded to the
extent that antecedent questions about the scope
of field interrogation authority are left unresolved.
The effort here is not to reexamine the full range of
issues involved in these practices. It is, instead, to
focus attention on two questions that are of fundamental importance in any attempt to resolve
problems relating to field interrogation and to
examine the adequacy of the Court's response to
these questions. The first of these questions is
whether police may properly use field interrogation
to control the conduct of a person they believe is
about to commit a crime. The second question is
whether notions about consent ought to be given
legal recognition in the field interrogation context.
These questions are raised following a brief discussion of the three opinions.
A SummARY or m CASES
Terry v. Ohio. A Cleveland detective observed Terry and co-defendant Chilton engaged in
behavior that suggested to him they were "casing"
a downtown store for a daylight robbery. For ten
or twelve minutes they engaged in repeated observations of the store and then returned to converse with one another on a streetcomer. During
this time, a third man, Katz, briefly conversed with
both of them on the comer. Terry and Chilton left
the streetcomer and walked in the opposite direction from the store they had been observing. As
they again met with Katz, the detective approached the three men and asked their names. He
testified that he received a "mumbled" response.
He turned Terry around, frisked him, and felt a
hard object which he believed to be a gun in the
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breast pocket of his overcoat but was unable to
remove it. He ordered all three men into a nearby
store, removed Terry's overcoat, and retrieved a
gun. He ordered all three men to raise their hands
and face the wall. A frisk of Chilton also turned up
a gun. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon after his pretrial motion to suppress the
gun was denied by the trial court.
An Ohio Court of Appeals 12 held that the activities of the defendant were sufficiently suspicious to
permit inquiry and that an officer may frisk for
self-protection incident to such an inquiry. The
Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed petitioner's
appeal on the ground that no substantial constitutional question was involved,"8 and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 4
In an eight-to-one decision, the Court affirmed
the conviction. Chief Justice Warren wrote the
majority opinion, concurred in by Justices Brennan, Stewart, Fortas, and Marshall. Justices Harlan, Black, and White wrote separate concurring
opinions. Justice Douglas dissented.
The defense argued that the Court should not
legitimate any interference with a citizen in the
absence of probable cause to arrest because to do so
would lend unwanted support to other, more objectionable practices than those involved in this
case. The Court acknowledged that such practices
do occur but replied that "a rigid and unthinking
application of the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against practices which it can never be used
effectively to control, may exact a high toll in
human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent
crine." 15

On the government's side, the argument was
made that the practices involved in this case were
insufficiently odious to call the fourth amendment
into play because the actions of the officer did not
constitute a "search" or an "arrest." But the Court
avoided their previous arrest-or-nothing type of
analysis and concluded that the practices were
sufficiently odious to require justification even
though they do not amount to "arrests." 16 They
"State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114
(Cuyahoga County 1966).
"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968).
14387 U.S. 929 (1967).
"1Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968).
26 The arrest-or-nothing approach was used in Rios v.
United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), and Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). The statement in Rios is
typical:
But the Government argues that the policemen
approached the standing taxi only for the purpose
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are subject to fourth amendment standards including the application of the exclusionary rule when
such standards are violated.
Those standards are not satisfied by good faith
of the officer. The action must be based on "specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion." 17 The interest in crime
detection and prevention as well as the need to protect himself and others justified the frisk in this
case. The majority held:
"Our evaluation of the proper balance that
has to be struck in this type of case leads us to
conclude that there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer,
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual,
regardless of whether he has probable cause to
arrest the individual for a crime." 19
Sibron v. New York. Although Sibron and Pe-

ters were decided in the same opinion by the majority of the Court, they are more clearly discussed as
separate cases. Arresting Officer Martin, during
eight hours of patrol, observed Sibron
in conversation with six or eight persons whom
he... knew from past experience to be narcotics addicts. The officer testified that he did
not overhear any of these conversations, and
that he did not see anything pass between
Sibron and any of the others. Late in the evening Sibron entered a restaurant. Patrolman
Martin saw Sibron speak with three more
known addicts inside the restaurant. Once
again, nothing was overheard and nothing was
seen to pass between Sibron and the addicts.
Sibron sat down and ordered pie and coffee,
and as he was eating Patrolman Martin approached him and told him to come outside.
of routine interrogation, and that they had no
intent to detain the petitioner beyond the momentary requirements of such a mission. If the petitioner thereafter voluntarily revealed the package
of narcotics to the officers' view, a lawful arrest
could then have been supported by their reasonable
cause to believe that a felony was being committed
in their presence. The validity of the search thus
turns upon the narrow question of when the arrest
occurred, and the answer to that question depends
upon an evaluation of the conflicting testimony of
those who were there that night.
364 U.S. at 262 (footnote omitted).
1"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (footnote
omitted).
18Id. at 27.

Once outside, the officer said to Sibron, "You
know what I am after." According to the officer, Sibron "mumbled something and reached
into his pocket." Simultaneously, Patrolman
Martin thrust his hand into the same pocket,
discovering several glassine envelopes, which,
it turned out, contained heroin 9
With some ambivalence, the trial court concluded that the officer had probable cause to arrest
Sibron and that the search was properly incident
to that arrest. That court did not rely on the New
York stop-and-frisk statute. The New York Court
of Appeals affirmed without opinion, ° but the dissent there indicated the majority decision was
based on the New York statute."1 That statute was
also urged as justification for the police conduct in
the state's initial brief filed with the United States
Supreme Court opposing jurisdiction." After probable jurisdiction was noted by the Court, the New
York County Attorney tendered a confession of
error."
Despite claims that the issue in Sibron's case
was moot, and despite the confession of error, the
Court decided the case on the merits. At the same
time, the Court refused to decide the constitutionality of the New York statute.
The Court, in five opinions, reversed Sibron's
conviction. Chief Justice Warren again wrote the
majority opinion, concurred in by Justices Brennan, White, Stewart, and Marshall. Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, seemed to agree with the
approach of the majority. Justice Harlan reiterated
the analysis he advocated in Terry.21Justice Fortas
would have given more weight to the confession of
error, and Justice Black dissented on the ground
that the police action was taken in reasonable selfdefense.
The majority, as they had in Terry, defined the
frisk as the intrusion that had to be justified because, they concluded, the record was unclear
whether Sibron was under restraint before the
19Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,45 (1968).
20 People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 219 N.E.2d 196,
272 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1966).
2Id.
at 604,219 N.E.2d at 197,272 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
22 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,47-48 (1968).
2 Id. at 48.
24
Id. at 61. The failure of the Court to deal with the
New York stop-and-frisk statute undoubtedly came as
a surprise to many observers. The position of the majority seems to have been that the statute is so vague that
the Court could not tell exactly what it authorized and
therefore could not determine its constitutionality. Id.
at 60-61 n.20.
25 See text accompanying notes 54-57 infra.
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search occurred. They held that the evidentiary
requirement for a self-protective search was not
present in this case, and that the search was not
properly limited in scope because it extended beyond patting down the exterior of the suspect's
clothing. Thus, Sibron was dearly an effort to indicate that the thrust of Terry was not to give the
constitutional imprimatur to coercive intrusions
based on evidence as slight as that present in this
case.
Peters v. New York. During the afternoon, an
off-duty New York City patrolman, Lasky, heard
noises at his sixth-floor apartment door. He received a telephone call and after he hung up, he
looked into the hall through a peep-hole in his door
and saw two men tiptoeing down the hall. He did
not recognize them as residents of his apartment
building. He telephoned the local Mount Vernon
police, completed dressing, and returned to the
door. The strangers were then tiptoeing toward the
stairway although an elevator was available. As
Lasky emerged into the hall armed and slammed
his apartment door the suspects fled down the
stairs. He apprehended one of them after a chase
covering a flight and a half of stairs. The other man
escaped. The officer asked the detained suspect
what he was doing in the building. Peters claimed
he was looking for a girlfriend but said he would
not identify her because she was married. The officer took him down another half flight of stairs to
the fourth floor and frisked him. He felt something
hard in the suspect's pants pocket and testified it
"could have been" a knife. He removed an unsealed opaque plastic envelope and found burglary
tools in it. The suspect was convicted on his guilty
plea for unlawful possession of burglary tools after
the trial court denied his pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained by Officer Lasky.
Every member of the Court except justice Harlan agreed that probable cause existed to arrest
Peters for attempted burglary. The New York
Court of Appeals had dearly felt the conduct of the
officer could be justified only on the basis of the
stop-and-frisk statute. 26 The notion that probable
cause existed to arrest for any crime was not mentioned in their opinion. The majority of the Court
adverted to this rationale of the New York Court
of Appeals, but observed: "This may be the justification for the search under state law. We think,
however, that for purposes of the Fourth Amend26 People v. Peters, 18 N.Y.2d 238, 219 N.E.2d 595,
273 N.Y.S.2d 217 (1966).
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ment the search was properly incident to a lawful
arrest. By the time Officer Lasky caught up with
Peters on the stairway between the fourih and fifth
floors of the apartment building, he had probable
cause to arrest him for attempted burglary." 2 As
if Terry had never been decided, the Court found
that Peters was arrested the moment he was restrained and that the search was incident to that
lawful arrest. Despite their conclusion that Peters
was properly arrested, the Court justified the subsequent search with the conclusion that "Officer
Lasky did not engage in an unrestrained and thorough-going examination of Peters and his personal
effects. He seized him to cut short his flight, and he
searched him primarily for weapons. While patting
down his outer clothing, Officer Lasky discovered
an object in his pocket which might have been used
as a weapon." 2 This language appears to be a justification for a Terry-type frisk rather than a statement of traditional authority to search incident to
an arrest. Certainly, searches justified as "incidental" to arrest are not limited to searching for
weapons, nor are they restricted to patting-dowp
outer clothing.
These problems again prompted justice Harlan
to concur specially. He disagreed with the majority's conclusions that probable cause to arrest
existed at the time Peters was restrained. He also
objected to what appeared to be a reversion by the
majority to the earlier arrest-or-nothing analysis of
cases like Rios which the Court had expressly
eschewed in Terry. Indeed, Rios and%-Henry are
prominent in the majority opinion. Part of the
disagreement also seems to be whether probable
cause to arrest and the arrest must precede the
search as the majority opinion implied, or whether
it suffices if probable cause to arrest exists prior to
the search, whether or not the arrest has actually
occurred. justice Harlan argued that "[tlhere is no
case inwhich a defendant may validly say, 'Although the officer had a right to arrest me at the
moment when he seized me and searched my person, the search is invalid because he did not in fact
arrest me until afterwards.' "29
27 Sibron

v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,66 (1968).
Id. at 67.
19Id. at 77 (concurring opinion). Similar views of the
propriety of a search-then-arrest sequence is gaining
judicial support. See, e.g., Holt v. Simpson, 340 F.2d 853
(7th Cir. 1965). The problem is discussed in Barrett,
PersonalRights, PropertyRights, and the FourthAmendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REv. 46.
2
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FIELD INTERROGATION AS A CONTROL
ON INTENDING CnINaALS

Convictions for anything but vagrancy under
these circumstances are not possible unless exceptional, fortuitous circumstances are also present.
Preparation to commit a crime is not made criminal
per se so that whether an intending criminal may be
arrested for prosecution is essentially left to chance.
This discrepancy between what police assume to be
their role and the limitations imposed by rules
embodying a contrary assumption is probably
largely responsible for the long life accorded vagrancy laws and is reflected in the proliferation of
possession-with-intent type of statutes.
Field interrogation raises the same question.
Both case law and existing statutes authorizing
field interrogation permit police to stop, question,
and frisk when they have evidence indicating that
the suspect is about to commit a crime. Indeed,
the Model State Statute on "Stop and Frisk" which
has been prepared and distributed by the Americans for Effective Law Enforcement provides:
"Whenever any peace officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which
reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
criminal offense, he may detain such person." The
position paper which accompanies the circulation
of this proposal makes it dear that the field interrogation authority includes the power to engage in
detention designed to prevent the commission of
crime as .well as to detect perpetrators:

Glanville Williams has argued that "[i]n a rational system of justice the police would be given
every encouragement to intervene early where a
suspect is dearly bent on crime. Yet in England, if
the police come on the scene too early they may
find that they can do nothing with the intending
offender except admonish him." 10 Theformai law
situation has not been strikingly different in American jurisdictions. The important-and unanswered
-question is this: Is it part of the function of the
police'to try to prevent crime by physically interrupting persons believed to be contemplating a
crime? Remarkably little attention has been given
to this question. Present field interrogation practices raise this issue.
Many police feel they need authority to engage
in what they call "aggressive, preventive patrol"
practices. Police departments are often assigned
and accept responsibility for crime rates in a city,
and they often gauge their effectiveness as police not
so much by the percentage of crimes "cleared" but
by whether or not they can reduce the incidence of
crime. Procedural restrictions on police interferences with citizens, on the other hand, usually
have been thought to limit police authority to those
instances in which the police have evidence indicating a suspect probably has committed a crime."
The tensions between these competing assumpEven when the police are forced to release the
tions about the proper scope of police authority
suspect because of his refusal to answer queshave been exposed predominately in the vagrancy
tions or because no evidence of an attempted
law controversy. The New York Court of Appealsi
crime is found at the scene, the very act of
for example, declared unconstitutional the New
temporary detention and questioning may
York vagrancy statute partly because the authordeter, at least for that night, a potential
ity to arrest under these types of laws was used by
criminal act of violence. That, in itself, would
the police to avoid restrictions imposed by substanbe a worthwhile result, since the duty of the
tive and procedural codes." A second -practice
police is not only to apprehend persons who
which raises the issue is the unsystematic legislative
have already committed criminal acts, but
responses to particular inchoate behavior such as
also to prevent crimes from occurring in the
both Terry and Peters involved. The suspect who
first place."
was intending to commit armed robbery can be
arrested because he will be found to be in the pos- Thus, these rules do encourage the police to intersession of a concealed weapon. So, too, in many vene early, but the police may not arrest unless the
states, the incipient burglar may be arrested if he frisk turns up something upon which to base a
brought along specialized tools, but not otherwise. prosecution.
30Williams, Police Control of Intending Criminals,
To the extent that field interrogation practices
1955 CRDr.L. Rav. 66.
are
conceived to range well beyond conviction" See Tiffany, Field Interrogation: Adninistrative,
"3The model act and the accompanying commentary
Judicial and Legislative Approaches, 43 DENvERiL.J.
can be obtained from Americans for Effective Law
389, 395-98 (1966).
2Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 229 N.E.2d 426, Enforcement, Inc., 33 North Dearborn Street. Chicago,
Illinois 60602.
282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
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oriented processes and to include as well efforts to
control intending criminals by non-conviction
means, questions are raised whether these preventive practices can realistically be separated from
other, less desirable practices and whether such
preventive practices can be controlled.
Field interrogation is only one of the specific
practices engaged in by police under the rubric
"aggressive, preventive patrol." Many other practices are attributable to the same orientation to
prevent crime from being committed in the first
place. The following paragraphs are a description
of one such practice, the so-called "battle of the
comer." 34
Both uniformed patrolmen and members of the
Juvenile Aid Division, but primarily the former,
engage in constant confrontation with Negro
youths who congregate on streetcorners in the
urban area. The youths insist on what is called
corner-lounging, and the police insist on dispersing
them. Recalcitrance is punished by arrest. The
study concluded:
"Interviews with both juveniles and District policemen reveals something of the dynamics of the 'battle of the comer.' Both apparently see these encounters as challenges
to their manhood. Neither party expresses a
willingness to allow the comer to go to the
other by default. In many respects, both
parties view the encounters as a game, albeit
a deadly serious game. Among some of the
younger officers, one encounters a sense of
dedication never to lose the battle of the
comer. Part of the young policeman's lore is
the fact that losing the battle is seen as one of
the most serious 'defeats' a policeman can
suffer. Older officers, of course, have often
tired of these encounters and unconsciously
avoid 'showdowns.' Many of them, however,
also reveal an unwillingness to lose if a showdown is unavoidable.
"'The drawing of the battle lines,' however, has apparently been as much the consequence of public pressure as it has been the
product of the policeman's action. In numerous interviews, policemen justify their
dispersal of corner-lounging groups on the
basis of complaints from the public. Visitations to various neighborhoods in the city
31 IV FIELD SURvEYs, LomuN & MISNER, THE
POLICE AND THE CommuNrry: THE DNAecs OF THmj;
RELATIONSHIP IN A CHANGING SOCIETY, vol. 2, at 156

(1967).
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and to various District police confirms the
fact that there are many public complaints
about comer-lounging groups creating a disturbance or shouting insults or obscenities.
Furthermore, many policemen use their selective experience to point to the fact that many
groups assemble on the corner as a prelude to
more serious misbehavior and delinquency." 35
The relationship of this type of practice to field
interrogation depends largely upon one's definition of field interrogation. 6 The practices often
involve questioning, detention, and searching.
Nevertheless, they are functionally different from
those situations in which the police are trying to
obtain information about the commission of
crime. The point is not that the kind of field interrogation involved in Terry is indistinguishable
from these preventive practices; it is rather that
police have not made sufficient efforts to maintain
the distinction in practiceY Related prevention
practices often shade imperceptibly into police assumption of control of movement in public places,
at least in high crime areas at night." Such practices are often what the police take "crime prevention" to mean.
One of the ironies of empirical research into the
field-interrogation question is that the most
difficult problem of such research is to isolate
conceptually those instances in which the police
stop and question a person whose conduct has
raised a fair question as to his involvement in
criminal activity from all the other things that
patrol officers do, including indiscriminately conducted stop-and-search programs designed to
confiscate guns, and harassment of teenagers in
minority areas." There are probably few observers
who would completely deny the utility and necessity of stopping and questioning suspects when
probable cause to arrest does not exist-if, that
is, temporary on-the-street detention power would
be carefully limited in actual day-to-day police
practices. Just as obviously, present street
practices in many cities are unjustified and harmful.
Thus, one of the dominant themes running
through the controversy over the legitimacy of
field interrogation relates primarily to the anticipated (and present) abuse of the power to in31Ibid.

36See DETECTION,supranote 5, ch. 1.
3Se text accompanying note 11 supra.
H See DETECTION. supra note 5, ch. 1.
9 Ibid. ,.-
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terfere with persons who may not be arrested.
Aggressive tactics are common. They are often
largely motivated by poorly articulated efforts to
somehow prevent crimes and are encouraged in
many instances by police efforts to remain "in
charge" of the streets. The importance of Terry
in this context is whether Court authorization for
the police to "deal with" possibly intending
criminals in ways not involving efforts to prosecute
will be interpreted by the police as lending support
to such tactics.
Chief Justice Warren adverted at some length
to the inadequacy of the exclusionary rule as a
control on police-citizen encounters which are not
motivated by a desire on the part of the police to
secure evidence usable in a criminal prosecution.
For the majority in Terry, he observed: "Regardless
of how effective the rule may be where obtaining
convictions is an important objective of the police,
it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally
guaranteed rights where the police either have no
interest in prosecuting or are willing to forego successful prosecution in the interest of serving some
other goal." 4 0 Yet the Court concluded, in response
to defense arguments, that the existence of a
"protean variety" of street encounters ought not
to result in "a rigid and unthinking application of
the exclusionary rule, in futile protest against
practices which it can never be used effectively to
control...." 41 Further, the Court said, "our approval of legitimate and restrained investigative
conduct undertaken on the basis of ample factual
justification should in no way discourage the employment of other remedies than the exclusionary
rule to curtail abuses for which that sanction may
prove inappropriate." 4
It is important, however, to determine exactly
what the Court means by "legitimate and restrained investigative conduct." There is language
in these cases which indicates that at least several
members of the Court are willing to recognize
police authority to interfere with persons despite
the indication that the "suspect" cannot be convicted of any offense. The majority in Terry said
a legitimate state interest is "effective crime prevention and detection." 4 Justice White, speaking
about the frisk in that case, said: "Perhaps the
frisk itself, where proper, will have beneficial re40 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968) (footnote
omitted).
41

Id. at 15.

4 Ibid.
4Id. at

22.

sults whether questions are asked or not. If weapons are found, an arrest will follow. If none are
found, thefrisk may~nevertheless serve preventive ends
because of its unmistakable message that suspieion
has been aroused." 4 Even Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that searches and seizures must be predicated on probable cause, but that fourth amendment standards are satisfied if the officer has
probable cause to believe that "a crime was about
to be committed." 45
Justice Harlan concluded in his concurring
opinion that the officer's conduct in Sibron fell
below Terry standards and observed: "There must
be something at least in the activities of the person
being observed or in his surroundings that affirmatively suggests particular criminal activity,
completed, current, or intended." 41
Justice Harlan agreed that Peters should be affirmed, but on the basis of the right to stop and
question, not on the majority's view that probable
cause to arrest existed. He observed that probable
cause has been taken to mean: "Evidence that
would warrant a prudent and reasonable man ...
in believing that a particular person has committed
or is committing a crime." 0 The omission of
reference to future conduct of the suspect was
deliberate: "unlike probable cause to arrest, reasonable grounds to stop do not depend on any
degree of likelihood that a crime has been committed. An officer may forcibly intrude upon an
incipient crime even where he could not make an
arrestfor the simple reason that there is nothing to
arrestanyonefor, Hence although Officer Lasky had
small reason to believe that a crime had been committed, his right to stop Peters can be justified if
he had a reasonable suspicion that he was about to
attempt burglary." 4 Justice Douglas, concurring in
the affirmance of Peters' conviction, took this
position: "I would hold that at the time Lasky
seized petitioner, he had probable cause to believe
that petitioner was on some kind of burglary or
49
housebreaking mission."
One implication of this language is that preventive--or at least anticipatory---searches and
seizures are not necessarily incompatible with the
fourth amendment. But Terry does little to resolve
the uncertainty. Indeed, the ambiguous fourth
44 Id. at 34-35 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
4Id.
at 35 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
46Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968) (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
4 Id. at 75 (footnote omitted).
43 Id. at 78 (emphasis added).
49
1Id. at 69 (concurring opinion).
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amendment status of police coercive intrusions
which are not designed to secure convictions is
significantly perpetuated by these cases. Certainly,
the question is important enough to require more
critical evaluation than the Court has thus far
given it. It is not clear that a majority of the Court
would be willing to unambiguously hold that
there are instances in which the police may coercively intrude upon a person they believe may be
contemplating the commission of a crime. It is
clear, however, that the exclusionary rule will
have little or no impact as a control device on this
species of anticipatory detention because of the
underlying assumption of that rule that overly
aggressive police tactics are designed to secure
convictions. But the Court gives considerable support to those "preventive" practices despite
recognition that such practices may be beyond
the control of the judiciary.
THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN FIELD INTERROGATION
PRACTICES

Another important question in field interrogation practices is left unresolved by the Terry doctrine and follows both from the fact that the
Court did not address the question of limitations
upon the purposes of legitimate field interrogations
and from the fact that the Court declined to deal
with the question of detention prior to the frisk of
the suspects. Because the police were obviously
dealing with suspects in all three cases, the Court
addressed only the question of police-suspect confrontations. Thus, the question whether judicial application of notions about consent might vary significantly when the person confronted is believed
to be a witness, in contrast to the instance in
which he is believed to a perpetrator, was not
clarified. 50 But even when it is clear that the
5 The pre-Terry draft of the ALI MODEL CODE OF
PRE-uRAiN i
T PRocEDuRE (Tent. Draft No. 1,

1966) does provide for authority to interrogate witnesses. Section 2.02(1) provides:
Stopping of Persons Having Knowledge of Crime.

A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any
place may, if he has reasonable cause to believe that
a felony or misdemeanor has been committed and
that any person has knowledge which may be of
material aid to the investigation thereof, order such
person to remain in or near such place in the
officer's presence for a period of not more than
twenty minutes.
Police authority in this section which covers both suspects and witnesses is more restricted than when only
a suspect is involved. Section 2.02(2), which covers only
suspects, has a lower evidentiary standard:
Stopping of Personsin Suspicious Circumstances.
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police are dealing with a suspect, the Court seems
willing to give considerable latitude to consent
doctrines.
The Court in Terry refused to treat the initial
confrontation as involving restraint.
"We thus decide nothing today concerning
the constitutional propriety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause
for purposes of 'detention' and/or interrogation. Obviously, not all personal intercourse
between policemen and citizens involves
'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of
a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred. We cannot tell with any certainty
upon this record whether any such "seizure"
took place here prior to Officer McFadden's
initiation of physical contact for purposes of
searching Terry for weapons and we thus may
assume that up to that point no intrusion upon
constitutionally protected rights had occurred." 5
The Court took a parallel position in Sibrrn:
"We are not called upon to decide in this case
whether there was a 'seizure' of Sibron inside the
restaurant antecedent to the physical seizure
which accompanied the search." 52 The Court concluded that the record would not permit a determination '"whether Sibron accompanied Patrolman Martin outside in submission to a show of
force or authority which left him no choice, or
whether he went voluntarily in a spirit of apparent
cooperation with the officer's investigation." 11
On the other hand, in Terry, the Court pointed
out that "[i]t is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person which do
not eventuate in a trip to the station house and
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any
place may, if a person is observed in circumstances
which suggest that he has committed or is about to
commit a felony or misdemeanor, and such action
is reasonably necessary to enable the officer to
determine the lawfulness of that person's conduct,
order that person to remain in'or near such place in
the officer's presence for a period of not more than
twenty minutes.
However, the difference in standards may be illusory,
because in any high crime area, the police always have
reasonable
cause to believe that a crime has been committed unless
the section is interpreted to be more
limited in terms of location or immediacy than the
language requires.
" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
52 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,63 (1968).
"Ibid.
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prosecution for crime-'arrests' in traditional
terminology. It must be recognized that whenever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person." 14
One result of the Court's refusal to treat the
initial confrontation in these cases as involving
detention was that the Court was called upon
to determine only the propriety of the frisk and
thus avoided a decision about the evidentiary
basis of an initial investigatory detention not
accompanied by a frisk. This, of course, obscures
the question whether there are differences in the
standards justifying the two actions.
The more important question left unanswered
is: When, if ever, should a confrontation between
a police officer and a suspect not be treated as involving restraint? The Court was careful to point
out that the treatment of the initial confrontations
in these two cases as being without restraint had
no material impact on the disposition. At some
point between confrontation and taking a suspect to the station restraint occurs, and the only
guidance given on the question is that restraint
will be found to be involved when there is a "show
of force," a term left undefined by the Court.
Whether a "confrontation" of a suspect is a
"show of force," or whether that term should
refer to something like display of weapons, is an
important question to resolve.
The majority view that Terry and Sibron may
have voluntarily cooperated in their undoing led
justice Harlan to feel "constrained to fill in a few
gaps ....., He differed from the approach of
Chief Justice Warren in two major respects. First,
"if the frisk is justified in order to protect the
officer during an encounter with a citizen, the
officer must first have constitutional grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop." 56
Second, "[w]here such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be immediate and
automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an
articulable suspicion of a crime of violence." 7
He concluded that "Officer McFadden's right to
interrupt Terry's freedom of movement and invade
his privacy arose only because circumstances warranted forcing an encounter with Terry in an effort to prevent or investigate a crime. Once that
forced encounter was justified, however, the of5

1Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
o5Id. at 31 (concurring opinion).
11Id. at 32.
67Id. at 33.

ficer's right to take suitable measures for his own
safety followed automatically" when the original
suspicion related to a crime of violence.3
In a large majority of encounters between
police and citizens, or even between police and
suspects, it is quite ambiguous whether the citizen
is under restraint, if that term refers to whether or
not he can walk away. One of the main problems
with assuming, in the absence of clear evidence to
the contrary, that suspects may voluntarily cooperate with the police during a field interrogation
is that the right to be free from the annoyance of
public inquiries by the police may belong only to
those persons who are willing to risk resolution of
the ambiguity inherent in those encounters. This
is an especially undesirable judicial policy given
the fact that refusal to "cooperate" with beatpatrol officers is often viewed by them both as an
indication that the suspect is in fact guilty of
something and as an attempt on the suspect's part
to undermine the authority of the investigating
officer.59 Furthermore, the suspect has no way to
decide whether the investigating officer has
authority to stop him or not.
It may have been somewhat understandable
that the judiciary would rely on notions of consent or cooperation to resolve fourth amendment
problems in this context when they were required
to choose between consent and arrest as the only
justifications for evidence acquisition by police.
But recognition of coercive investigative authority
in the absence of probable cause to arrest ought
.to alleviate the pressure to resolve ambiguous confrontations by creation of a presumption of consent. In terms of an evidentiary antecedent, a
request for cooperation need not be reasonable in
the constitutional sense, and even the Terry
evidence-of-guilt standard need not be met.
An additional problem with the consent doctrine in this context is that it is doubtful that courts
could realistically and uniformly resolve factual
matters which involve the subtle psychological interaction in police-suspect confrontations. 0 Difficulty of adjudication alone might be insufficient
reason to deny the police needed authority to investigate crime. The question is whether the need
to use consent doctrines still exists. It would be an
unfortunate diversion from the significant fourth
amendment issues involved in field interrogation to
5

3Id. at 34.
11DETECTiON, supra note 5, at 57.
60See, e.g., Project, Interrogations in New Haven:
The Impact of Miranda,76 YATE L.J. 1519 (1967).
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focus on whether the suspect voluntarily cooperated rather than focusing on the justification for
the police conduct involved.
A dichotomic approach to that problem expressed in terms of "detention" versus "voluntary
cooperation" is less than helpful. To observe that
not all police-suspect confrontations are coercive
is beside the point. If courts will be unable realistically to evaluate the assorted reasons suspects
may appear to be cooperative with an investigating
officer, the task is to select the policy that would
be most responsive to the need to resolve the
competing interests. The Court's recognition that
any restraint of suspects by police brings that
conduct within the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonableness will provide little protection as long as police can take legal advantage of
the ambiguity inherent in most street confrontations.
CONCLUSION

Too often the assumption has been made that
when the courts deal with something called
"criminal procedure" they are concomitantly
dealing with most of the significant problem areas
of police conduct. The Court candidly recognized
that this assumption is grossly inaccurate. In large
part this litigation hiatus is due not so much to
the ambit of the fourth amendment as it is to the
scope of remedies used to control and limit police
activities. The exclusionary rule, of course, is currently the most frequently invoked remedy. The
formal limitations on that remedy are numerous,
and the conditions under which it may be thought
to be effective are quite limited. First, it cannot
be effective unless illegally obtained evidence is
needed by the state to convict the defendant, and
this will not be the case when improper police
conduct does not result in state acquisition of
evidence or when the state has other evidence
sufficient to convict. Second, many procedural obstacles exist to limit the frequency of invocation
of the rule. If the appropriate motion is not made
at the appropriate time, the issues may escape
formal litigation. Given the predominance of the
guilty plea system in all jurisdictions, it is likely
that most questions of police illegality become only
additional factors in the bargaining process. The
defendant must also have satisfied "standing" requirements to move to suppress. Third, indirect
uses may still be made of illegally obtained evidence, such as by introduction at trial of that
evidence to impeach the defendant; and, the so-
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called "fruits" doctrine cannot prevent all indirect benefit to the police.
Finally-and this is the main problem-the
exclusionary rule derives whatever efficacy it may
have from the underlying assumption that when
the police engage in illegal conduct it is for the
purpose of securing a conviction. The fallacy in
61
this assumption has been amply documented.
It should be hoped that the Court's explicit recognition of this limitation in Terry will contribute to
increased attention to that "protean variety" of
police-citizen confrontations which do not contemplate prosecution. Preoccupation with the
propriety of methods of obtaining convictions has
been the natural result of preoccupation with appellate cases. The point is not to belittle the significance of concern with the manner of obtaining
convictions; obviously, research of the type now
2
underway concerning the impact of Miranda, as
one example, is vital to any sensible rulemaking designed to control conviction-oriented aspects of
police practices. The point is that conviction processes are not all that is important about police
practices. Indeed there is some evidence that conviction processes are becoming relatively less important as the way in which our criminal justice
systems manage rulebreaking.
Development of meaningful controls over this
aspect of police work will require more adequate
identification and description of those practices
and identification of the pressures or conditions
contributing to their widespread existence. Most
important is recognition that control over nonconviction processes cannot be relegated to the
courts armed only with the exclusionary rule.
Whether police on-the-street intrusive practices
are oriented toward conviction or not, the need for
adequate standards and controls is difficult to
overstate. One interpretation of Terry is that the
Court for the moment has left the initial responsibility for this to the relevant administrative
agencies. The problems are difficult, but it is important that they be resolved intelligently and as
quickly as possible. In the absence of positive
departmental responses which give some indication
of police awareness of an obligation to accept the
opportunity provided by Terry to behave like
responsible administrative agencies, it is likely
61
See, e.g., LAFAvE, supra note 5.
6 An excellent comment on Miranda research may be
found in ALl

MODEL CODE

or

PRE-ARRAGNMENT

PROcEDuRE, Part II (Study Draft No. 1,1968).
63 Linton, Administrative Stabilization of Conviction
Rates, August, 1968 (unpublished paper).
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that future field interrogation cases decided by the
Court will contain less doctrinal ambiguity and
will be more restrictive on police.
The likelihood exists, of course, that Terry will
not be viewed this way by police officials. Because
of the vagueness of the language used on many of
the important issues and because of the approval
of the police conduct leading to Terry's conviction, Terry may be taken as broad approval of
current police field interrogation practices. If that
view of Terry is prevalent and has the effect of
encouraging present aggressive police tactics on
the street, the dominant impact of Terry may be
to encourage more and more judicial intervention
to curtail those practices."
The major doctrinal implication of Terry was
underscored by Justice Douglas in his dissent: He
pointed out that "[w]e hold today that the police
have greater authority to make a 'seizure' and
conduct a 'search' than a judge has to authorize
such action." 65 Presumably this is so because it is
thought that judges are limited to the traditional
warrant-issuance process, and that the prerequisite
under that procedure will continue to be a higher
evidentiary standard ("probable cause") than is
required of police by Terry for field interrogation
("reasonableness"). Obviously the role of magistrates in enforcing the fourth amendment has
never been as significant as the authority exercised
by contemporary police, 66 and this is true despite
64 "This attitude [of justifying failure to
observe procedural restrictions imposed by
courts] often prompts the imposition of even
greater restrictions on police authority. Courts
are undoubtedly influenced by their assumption as to how police will react to legal requirements. If there is confidence that they will stay
well within defined limits, their powers may be
stated broadly; but, if it is thought that they
will regularly exceed the limits, the tendency is
to impose severe and perhaps unrealistic limitations upon their authority."
LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 512 (footnotes omitted).
"Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,36 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
66 Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass
Production,in THE COURTS, THE PtBmuc, AND Tmm LAW
ExPLosioN 85, 117-18 (Jones ed. 1965). Professor
LaFave has concluded:
"The assumption apparently is that greater
protection for the individual is afforded by the
warrant procedure, since an arrest will be made
only if an impartial judicial officer, upon careful
evaluation of the evidence presented to him, determines that adequate grounds for an arrest exist.
But, at least in Kansas, Michigan, and Wisconsin,
it is clear that the warrant process does not serve
this function. Rather, the decision is made in the
office of the prosecutor and the judge routinely
signs the arrest warrant without any independent

the fact that the Court still romantically treats
arrests without warrants as the "exceptional" case
and extols the virtues of the warrant process. 7
But Terry represents the most important instance
of doctrinal recognition of this reality. The response
of police administrators to Terry may be one of
the most important factors controlling the longevity of this doctrinal shift.
A few of the current problems that inhere in
judicial efforts to control the police practice of
field interrogation have already been identified.
The exclusionary rule cannot control police activity which is not directed toward conviction,
and judicial reliance on notions of consent removes
field interrogation from the ambit of fourth amendment requirements because no "seizure" is found
to have occurred. But there is still another dimension to the problem. Judicial efforts to control
"the police" often seem to be based on an assumption that police departments are monolithic.
As a result little distinction has been made between
efforts to control the police hierarchy in the United
States on the one hand and efforts to control the
patrolman on the other. Efforts to control the
hierarchy assumes that the high-level administrators have effective control over patrolmen.
Efforts to control the patrolman assumes that he
is more responsive to external judicial control
than he is to the requirements of his sergeant.
Both of these assumptions are of doubtful validity.
It is especially the doubt about how much control
the police higher, echelon has over the day-to-day
decision-making of the officer on patrol that
renders fatuous any predictions about the efficacy
of adoption of field interrogation standards by
many departments in the wake of Terry. 8 Still,
inquiry into the facts and circumstances of the
individual case."
LAFAvE, supra note 5, at 502-03. See also D-TECTION,
supra note 5, ch. 8; Miller & Tiffany, ProsecutorDominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current
Practices, 1964 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1, 17:
"It is difficult to analyze comparatively the
formal law and current administrative practices
in the area of control over warrant issuance without concluding that an aura of unreality surrounds
the problem. Nowhere does the declared law seem
so at odds with the facts of the law in action. Yet
the formal law statements-as well as expressed concern over the situation-seem, on the surface at
least, to be aimed at shadows. The substance is
not at all what the commentators seem to assume
it is."
67 E.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
1Several police departments have issued training
bulletins on Stop-and-Frisk, among them being:
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the adoption of such administrative rules is a
necessary step in the development of administrative or other mechanisms designed to bring police
Chicago, Denver, Gary, New York City, Pittsburgh,
and San Jose, California. In each of these cases, the
bulletins were written by the department's Legal
Advisor.
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"aggressive, preventive patrol" practices under
control. Thus, the ability of departments to acquire
control of the behavior of their patrolmen on the
street is also likely to be of significance for the
survival of what is now taken to be rather broad
authority to maintain police field interrogation
practices.

